Speaker recognition (SR) is widely used in our daily life as a biometric authentication or identification mechanism. The popularity of SR brings in serious security concerns, as demonstrated by recent adversarial attacks. However, the impacts of such threats in the practical black-box setting are still open, since current attacks consider the white-box setting only.
Abstract-Speaker recognition (SR) is widely used in our daily life as a biometric authentication or identification mechanism. The popularity of SR brings in serious security concerns, as demonstrated by recent adversarial attacks. However, the impacts of such threats in the practical black-box setting are still open, since current attacks consider the white-box setting only.
In this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive and systematic study of the adversarial attacks on SR systems (SRSs) to understand their security weakness in the practical blackbox setting. For this purpose, we propose an adversarial attack, named FAKEBOB, to craft adversarial samples. Specifically, we formulate the adversarial sample generation as an optimization problem, incorporated with the confidence of adversarial samples and maximal distortion to balance between the strength and imperceptibility of adversarial voices. One key contribution is to propose a novel algorithm to estimate the score threshold, a feature in SRSs, and use it in the optimization problem to solve the optimization problem. We demonstrate that FAKEBOB achieves close to 100% targeted attack success rate on both open-source and commercial systems. We further demonstrate that FAKEBOB is also effective (at least 65% untargeted success rate) on both open-source and commercial systems when playing over the air in the physical world. Moreover, we have conducted a human study which reveals that it is hard for human to differentiate the speakers of the original and adversarial voices. Last but not least, we show that three promising defense methods for adversarial attack from the speech recognition domain become ineffective on SRSs against FAKEBOB, which calls for more effective defense methods. We highlight that our study peeks into the security implications of adversarial attacks on SRSs, and realistically fosters to improve the security robustness of SRSs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Speaker recognition [1] is an automatic technique to identify a person from utterances which contain audio characteristics of the speaker. Speaker recognition systems (SRSs) are ubiquitous in our daily life, ranging from biometric authentication [2] , [3] , forensic tests [4] , to personalized service on smart devices [5] . Machine learning techniques are the mainstream method for implementing SRSs [6] , however, they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (e.g., [7] , [8] , [9] ). Hence, it is vital to understand the security implications of SRSs under adversarial attacks.
Though the success of adversarial attack on image recognition systems has been ported to the speech recognition systems in both the white-box setting (e.g., [8] , [9] ) and black-box setting (e.g., [10] , [11] ), relatively little research has been done on SRSs. Essentially, the speech signal of an utterance consists of two major parts: the underlying text and the characteristics of the speaker. To improve the performance, speech recognition will minimize speaker-dependent variations to determine the underlying text or command, whereas speaker recognition will treat the phonetic variations as extraneous noise to determine the source of the speech signal. Thus, adversarial attacks tailored to speech recognition systems may become ineffective on SRSs.
An adversarial attack on SRSs aims at crafting a sample from a voice uttered by some source speaker, so that it is misclassified as one of the enrolled speakers (untargeted attack) or a target speaker (targeted attack) by the system under attack, but still correctly recognized as the source speaker by ordinary users. Though current adversarial attacks on SRSs [12] , [13] are promising, they suffer from the following three limitations: (1) They are limited to the white-box setting by assuming the adversary has access to the information of the target SRS. Attacks in a more realistic black-box setting are still open. (2) They only consider either the close-set identification task [12] that always classifies an arbitrary voice as one of the enrolled speakers [14] , or the speaker verification task [13] that checks if an input voice is uttered by the unique enrolled speaker or not [15] . Attacks on the open-set identification task [16] , which strictly subsumes both close-set identification and speaker verification, are still open. (3) They do not consider overthe-air attacks, hence it is unclear whether their attacks are still effective when playing over the air in the physical world. Therefore, in this work, we investigate the adversarial attack on all the three tasks of SRSs in the practical black-box setting, in an attempt to understand the security weakness of SRSs under adversarial attack in practice.
In this work, we focus on the black-box setting, which assumes that the adversary can obtain at most the decision result and scores of the enrolled speakers for each input voice. Hence attacks in the black-box setting is more practical yet more challenging than the existing white-box attacks [12] , [13] . We emphasize that the scoring and decision-making mechanisms of SRSs are different among recognition tasks [17] . Particularly, we consider 40 attack scenarios (as demonstrated in Fig. 2 ) in total differing in attack types (targeted vs. untargeted), attack channels (API vs. over the air), genders of source and target speakers, and SR tasks (cf. Section II-B).
To launch such a practical attack, two technical challenges need to be addressed: (1) crafting adversarial samples as less imperceptible as possible in the black-box setting, and (2) making the attack practical, namely, adversarial samples are effective on an unknown SRS, even when playing over the air in the physical world. In this paper, we propose a practical black-box attack, named FAKEBOB, which is able to overcome these challenges. More information on FAKEBOB please refers to https://sites.google.com/view/fakebob. Specifically, we formulate the adversarial sample generation as an optimization problem. The optimization objective is parameterized by a confidence parameter and the maximal distortion of noise amplitude in L ∞ norm to balance between the strength and imperceptibility of adversarial voices, instead of using noise model [9] , [18] , [19] , due to its device-and background-dependency. To solve the optimization problem, we leverage an efficient gradient estimation algorithm, i.e., the natural evolution strategy (NES) [20] . However, even with the estimated gradient, none of the existing gradient-based whitebox methods (e.g., [21] , [7] , [9] , [22] ) can be directly used to attack SRSs. This is due to the score threshold, a feature in SRSs, leading to a failed attack when the resulted score is less than the threshold. To this end, we propose a novel algorithm to estimate the threshold, based on which we leverage the Iterative Gradient Sign (IGS) method [7] with an estimated gradient to solve the optimization problem.
We evaluate FAKEBOB for its attacking capabilities, on two SRSs (i.e., ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM) in the popular open-source platform Kaldi [23] in the research community and two commercial systems (i.e., Talentedsoft [24] and Microsoft Azure [25] ) which are proprietary without any publicly available information about the internal design and implementations, hence completely black-box. We evaluate FAKEBOB using 13 representative attack scenarios (out of 40) based on the following five aspects: (1) effectiveness/efficiency, (2) transferability, (3) practicability, (4) imperceptibility, and (5) robustness.
The results show that FAKEBOB achieves 99% targeted attack success rate (ASR) on all the tasks of both ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems, and 100% ASR on the commercial system Talentedsoft within 2500 queries on average (cf. Section V-B). To demonstrate the transferability, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of transferability attack on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems under crossarchitecture, cross-dataset, and cross-parameter circumstances and the commercial system Microsoft Azure. FAKEBOB is able to achieve more than 50% transferability attack rate on all the systems by crafting high-confidence adversarial samples. To further demonstrate the practicability and imperceptibility, we launch an over-the-air attack in the physical world and also conduct a human study on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform [26] . The results indicate that FAKEBOB is effective when playing over the air in the physical world against both the open-source systems and Microsoft Azure (cf. Section V-D) and it is hard for humans to differentiate the speakers of the original and adversarial voices (cf. Section V-E).
Finally, we investigate four defense methods that are reported promising in speech recognition domain: audio squeezing [9] , [27] , local smoothing [27] , quantization [27] and temporal dependency-based detection [27] , due to lacking of domain-specific defense solutions for adversarial attack on SRSs. We implement and test the first three defense methods against our attacks, as speaker recognition does not have temporal dependency in general [17] . The results demonstrate that these three defense methods are ineffective on FAKEBOB, indicating that FAKEBOB is a practical and powerful adversarial attack on SRSs even in the physical world (cf. Section V-F).
Our study reveals that the security weakness of SRSs in the practical black-box setting under adversarial attacks. This weakness could lead to lots of serious security implications. For instance, the adversary could launch an adversarial attack (e.g., FAKEBOB) to bypass biometric authentication on the financial transaction and smart devices, as well as high-security intelligent voice control systems so that follow-up voice command attacks can be launched, e.g., CommanderSong [9] and Hidden voice commands [28] . Even for commercial systems, it is a significant threat under such a practical adversarial attack, which calls for more robust SRSs. To shed further light, we discuss the potential mitigation and further attacks to understand the arm race in this topic. In summary, our main contributions are:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of adversarial attacks on SRSs in the black-box setting. Our attack is launched by not only using gradient estimation based methods, but also incorporating the score threshold into the adversarial sample generation. The proposed algorithm to estimate the score threshold is unique in speaker recognition systems. • Our black-box attack addresses not only the speaker recognition tasks considered by existing white-box attacks but also the more general task, open-set identification, which has not been considered by existing adversarial attacks. • Our attack is demonstrated to be effective on both the popular open-source systems and commercial system Talentedsoft, transferable and practical on both the popular open-source systems and commercial system Microsoft Azure even when playing over the air in the physical world. • Our attack is robust against three potential defense methods which are reported very promising in speech recognition domain. Our study reveals the security implications of the adversarial attack on SRSs, which calls for more robust SRSs and more effective domain-specific defense methods.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries of speaker recognition systems (SRSs) and the threat model.
A. Speaker Recognition System (SRS)
Speaker recognition is an automatic technique that allows machines to recognize a person's identity based on his/her utterances using the characteristics of the speaker. It has been studied actively for four decades [17] , and currently supported by a number of open-source platforms (e.g., Kaldi, MSR Identity [29] and SIDEKIT [30] ), and commercial solutions (e.g., Microsoft Azure, Amazon Alexa [31] , Google home [32] , Talentedsoft, iFLYTEK [33], Tencent VPR [34] Fig. 1 shows an overview of a typical SRS, which includes five key modules: Feature Extraction, Universal Background Model (UBM) Construction, Speaker Model Construction, Scoring Module and Decision Module. The top part is an offline phase, while the lower two parts are an online phase composed of speaker enrollment and recognition phases.
In the offline phase, a UBM is trained using the acoustic feature vectors extracted from the background voices (i.e., voice training dataset) by the feature extraction module. The UBM, intending to create a model of the average features of everyone in the dataset, is widely used in the state-of-the-art SRSs to enhance the robustness and improve efficiency [1] . In the speaker enrollment phase, a speaker model is built using the UBM and feature vectors of enrolling speaker's voices for each speaker. During the speaker recognition phase, given an input voice x, the scores S(x) of all the enrolled speakers are computed using the speaker models, which will be emitted along with the decision D(x) as the recognition result.
The feature extraction module converts a raw speech signal into acoustic feature vectors carrying characteristics of the signal. Various acoustic feature extraction algorithms have been proposed such as Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [37] , Spectral Subband Centroid (SSC) [38] and Perceptual Linear Predictive (PLP) [39] . Among them, MFCC is the most popular one in practice [1] , [17] . Speaker recognition tasks. There are three common recognition tasks of SRSs: open-set identification (OSI) [16] , close-set identification (CSI) [14] and speaker verification (SV) [15] .
An OSI system allows multiple speakers to be enrolled during the enrollment phase, forming a speaker group G. For an arbitrary input voice x, the system determines whether x is uttered by one of the enrolled speakers or none of them, according to the scores of all the enrolled speakers and a preset (score) threshold θ. Formally, suppose the speaker group G has n speakers {1, 2, · · · , n}, the decision module outputs D(x):
where [S(x)] i for i ∈ G denotes the score of the voice x that is uttered by the speaker i. Intuitively, the system classifies the input voice x as the speaker i if and only if the score [S(x)] i of the speaker i is the largest one among all the enrolled speakers, and not less than the threshold θ. If the largest score is less than θ, the system directly rejects the voice, namely it is not uttered by any of the enrolled speakers. CSI and SV systems accomplish similar tasks as the OSI system, but with some special settings. A CSI system never rejects any input voices, i.e., an input will always be classified as one of the enrolled speakers. Whereas an SV system can have exactly one enrolled speaker and checks if an input voice is uttered by the enrolled speaker, i.e., either accept or reject. Text-Dependency. SRSs can be either text-dependent, where cooperative speakers are required to utter one of pre-defined sentences, or text-independent, where the speakers are allowed to speak anything. The former achieves high accuracy on short utterances, but always requires a large amount utterances repeating the same sentence, thus it is only used in the SV task. The latter may require longer utterances to achieve high accuracy, but practically it is more versatile and can be used in all tasks (cf. [17] ). Therefore, in this work, we mainly demonstrate our attack on text-independent SRSs. Remark that our attack is generic and able to attack text-dependent SRSs, which has been demonstrated on Microsoft Azure. SRS implementations. ivector-PLDA [40] , [41] is a mainstream method for implementing SRSs in both academia [23] , [42] , [43] and industries [34] , [44] , [45] , [46] . It achieves the state-of-the-art performance for all the speaker recognition tasks [47] , [48] . Another approach is GMM-UBM based methods, which train a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) [15] , [49] as UBM. Basically, GMM-UBM tends to provide comparative (or higher) accuracy on short utterances [50] .
Recently, deep neural network (DNN) becomes used in speech [51] and speaker recognition [52] , [53] , where speech recognition aims at determining the underlying text or command of the speech signal. However, the major breakthroughs made by DNN-based methods reside in speech recognition; for speaker recognition, ivector-PLDA based methods still exhibit the state-of-the-art performance [6] . Moreover, DNNbased methods usually rely on a much larger amount of labeled training dataset, which could greatly increase the computational complexity of training compared with ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM based methods [54] , thus are not suitable for off-line speaker enrollment on client-side devices.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the adversary wants to craft an adversarial sample from a voice uttered by some source speaker, so that it is classified as one of the enrolled speakers (untargeted attack) or the target speaker (targeted attack) by the SRS under attack, but is still recognized as the source speaker by ordinary users. Such an attack can be used to bypass biometric authentication on financial transaction and smartphones, as well as high-security intelligent voice control systems so that follow-up voice command attacks can be launched, e.g., CommanderSong [9] and Hidden voice commands [28] .
In this paper, we focus on the practical black-box setting where the adversary has access only to the recognition result 
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Inter-gender Gender Fig. 2 : Attack scenarios, where * means that targeted and untargeted are the same on the SV task, as an SV system only has one enrolled speaker.
(decision result and scores) of a target SRS for each test input, but not the internal configurations or training/enrollment voices. We emphasize that our black-box setting is feasible in practice, e.g., the SV task in the commercial system Talentedsoft [24] satisfies our black-box setting. This assumption renders all previous adversarial attacks impractical on SRSs, to the best of our knowledge. Specifically, in our attack model, we consider five parameters: attack type (targeted vs. untargeted attack), genders of speakers (inter-gender vs. intra-gender), attack channel (API vs. over-the-air), speaker recognition task (OSI vs. CSI vs. SV) and output of the target SRS (decision and scores vs. decisiononly) as shown in Fig. 2 . Intra-gender (resp. inter-gender) means that the genders of the source and target speakers are the same (resp. different). API attack assumes that the target SRS (e.g., Talentedsoft) provides an API interface to query, while over-the-air means that attacks should be played over the air in the physical world. To demonstrate the over-the-air attack, we use a built-in loudspeaker of a laptop (Lenovo) to play voices, and a built-in receiver of a mobile phone (OPPO) to record the air-transmitted voices (the distance between them is 0.5 meter [9] ), finally, the recorded voices are fed to the system via API. Decision-only attack means that the target SRS (e.g., Microsoft Azure) only outputs decision result (i.e., the adversary can obtain the decision result D(x)), but not the scores of the enrolled speakers. Therefore, targeted, inter-gender, over-the-air and decision-only attacks are the most practical yet the most challenging ones. In summary, by counting all the possible combinations of the parameters in Fig. 2 , there are 48 = 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 × 2 attack scenarios. Since targeted and untargeted attacks are the same on the SV task, we consider total 40 = 48 − 2 × 2 × 2 attack scenarios.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we start with the motivations, then explain the design philosophy of our attack in black-box setting and the possible defenses, finally present an overview of our attack.
A. Motivation
The research in this work is motivated by the following questions: (Q1) How to launch an adversarial attack against all the tasks of SRSs in the practical black-box setting? (Q2) Is it feasible to craft robust adversarial voices that are transferable to an unknown SRS under cross-architecture, cross-dataset and cross-parameter circumstances, and commercial systems, even when played over the air in the physical world? (Q3) Is it possible to craft human-imperceptible adversarial voices that are difficult, or even impossible, to be noticed by ordinary users? (Q4) If such an attack exists, can it be defended?
B. Design Philosophy
To address Q1, we investigate existing methods for blackbox attacks on image/speech recognition systems, i.e., surrogate model [55] , gradient estimation [56] , [20] and genetic algorithm [57] , [58] . Surrogate model methods are proved to be outperformed by gradient estimation methods [56] , hence are excluded. For the other two methods: it is known that natural evolution strategy (NES) based gradient estimation [20] requires much fewer queries than finite difference gradient estimation [20] , and particle swarm optimization (PSO) is proved to be more computationally efficient than other genetic algorithms [57] , [59] . To this end, we conduct a comparison experiment on an OSI system using NES as a black-box gradient estimation technique and PSO as a genetic algorithm. The result shows that the NES-based gradient estimation method obviously outperforms the PSO-based one (cf. Appendix A). Therefore, we exploit the NES-based gradient estimation.
However, even with the estimated gradient, none of the existing gradient based white-box methods (e.g., [21] , [7] , [60] , [61] , [9] , [19] , [18] , [22] ) can be directly used to attack SRSs. This is due to the threshold θ which is used in the OSI and SV tasks, but not in image/speech recognition. As a result, these methods will fail to mislead SRSs when the resulted score is less than θ. To solve this challenge, we incorporate the threshold θ into our adversarial sample generation and propose a novel algorithm to estimate θ in the black-box setting.
Theoretically, the adversarial samples crafted in the above way are effective if directly fed as input to the target SRS via exposed API. However, to launch a practical attack as in Q2, adversarial samples should be played over the air in the physical world to interact with a SRS that may differ from the SRS on which adversarial samples are crafted. To address Q2, we increase the strength of adversarial samples and the range of noise amplitude, instead of using noise model [9] , [18] , [19] , due to its device-and background-dependency. We have demonstrated that our approach is effective in transferability attack even when playing over the air in the physical world.
To address Q3, we should consider two aspects of the human-imperceptibility. First, the adversarial samples should sound natural when listened by ordinary users. Second, and more importantly, they should sound as uttered by the same speaker of the original one. As a first step towards addressing Q3, we add a constraint onto the perturbations using L ∞ norm, which restricts the maximal distortion at each sample point of the audio signal. We also conduct a real human study to illustrate the imperceptibility of our adversarial samples.
To address Q4, we should launch attacks on SRSs with defense methods. However, to our knowledge, no defense solution exists for adversarial attacks on SRSs. Therefore, we investigate four defense solutions for adversarial attacks on speech recognition systems: audio squeezing [9] , [27] , local smoothing [27] , quantization [27] and temporal dependencybased detection [27] . In general, the most versatile text- [17] . Therefore, we adopt the first three defense methods to defend against our attack.
C. Overview of Our Attack: FAKEBOB
According to our design philosophy, in this section, we present an overview (shown in Fig. 3 ) of our attack, named FAKEBOB, addressing two technical challenges: (C1) crafting human-imperceptible adversarial samples in the black-box setting, and (C2) making the attack practical, namely, adversarial samples are effective on an unknown SRS, even when playing over the air in the physical world.
To address C1, we formulate adversarial sample generation as an optimization problem (cf. Section IV-A), for which specific loss functions are defined for different attack types (i.e., targeted and untargeted) and tasks (i.e., OSI, CSI and SV) of SRSs (cf. Sections IV-B, IV-C and IV-D). To solve the optimization problem, we propose an approach by leveraging a novel algorithm to estimate the threshold, NES to estimate gradient and the IGS method with an estimated gradient. C2 is addressed by incorporating the strength of adversarial samples and maximal distortion (L ∞ norm) of noise amplitude into the loss functions (cf. Sections IV-B, IV-C and IV-D).
IV. OUR ATTACK: FAKEBOB
In this section, we elaborate on the techniques behind FAKEBOB, including the problem formulation and attacks on OSI, CSI, and SV systems.
A. Problem Formulation
Given an original voice, x, uttered by some source speaker, the adversary aims at crafting an adversarial voicex = x + δ by finding a perturbation δ such that (1)x is a valid voice, (2) δ is as human-imperceptible as possible, and (3) the SRS under attack classifies the voicex as one of the enrolled speaker or the target speaker. To guarantee that the adversarial voicex is a valid voice, which relies upon the audio file format (e.g., WAV, MP3 and AAC), our attack FAKEBOB first normalizes the amplitude value x(i) of a voice x at each sample point i into the range [−1, 1], then crafts the perturbation δ to make sure −1 ≤x(i) = x(i) + δ(i) ≤ 1, and finally transformsx back to the audio file format which will be fed to the target SRS. Hereafter, we assume that the range of amplitude values is [−1, 1]. To be as human-imperceptible as possible, our attack FAKEBOB adapts L ∞ norm to measure the similarity between the original and adversarial voices and ensures that the L ∞ distance x, x ∞ := max i {|x(i) − x(i)|} is less than the given To successfully fool the target SRS, we formalize the problem of finding an adversarial voicex for a voice x as the following constrained minimization problem:
where f is a loss function. It remains to define the loss function f and algorithm to solve the optimization problem. In the rest of this section, we mainly address them on the OSI system, then adapt to the CSI and SV systems.
B. Attack on OSI Systems
As shown in Fig. 4 , to attack an OSI system, we want to craft an adversarial voicex starting from a voice x uttered by some source speaker (i.e., D(x) = reject) such that the voicex is classified as the target speaker t ∈ G = {1, · · · , n} by the SRS, i.e., D(x) = t. We first present the loss function f and then show how to solve the minimization problem. Loss function f . To launch a successful targeted attack on an OSI system, the following two conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously: the score [S(x)] t of the target speaker t should be (1) the maximal one among all the enrolled speakers, and (2) not less than the preset threshold θ. Therefore, the loss function f for the target speaker t is defined as follows:
where the hyper-parameter κ, inspired by [22] , intends to control the strength of adversarial voices. In Eq. (2), the term max{θ, max i∈G\{t} [S(x)] i } selects the maximal value between the threshold θ and the scores of all the enrolled speakers except the target speaker t. (Remark that we will show how to estimate θ later.) Consider κ = 0,
either not the largest score or less than θ, indicating a failed attack. In general, we want to find some small perturbation δ such that the score [S(x)] t is the largest one, not less than θ, and [S(x)] t is at least κ greater than the maximal value between θ and the second-largest score. Therefore, the larger κ is, the stronger of the adversarial voice is.
To launch an untargeted attack, the loss function f can be revised as follows:
Intuitively, we want to find a perturbation δ such that the the largest score of x is at least κ greater than the threshold θ.
Solving the optimization problem. To solve the optimization problem in Eq. (1), we use NES as a gradient estimation technique and employ the IGS method with the estimated gradient to craft adversarial examples. Specifically, the IGS method begins by settingx i = 0 and then on the i th iteration,
where η is a hyper-parameter indicating the learning rate, and the function clip x, (x), inspired by [7] , performs persample clipping of the voicex, so the result will be in L ∞neighbourhood of the source voice x and will be a valid voice after transforming back into the audio file format. Formally,
To obtain the gradient ∇ x f (x i−1 ), we estimate the gradient by leveraging the NES based gradient estimation [20] , which only depends on recognition result. Specifically, on the i th iteration, we first estimate the gradient of f (x) overx i−1 which is obtained on the (i − 1) th iteration, and then exploit the gradient ∇
However, the IGS method with the estimated gradient alone is not sufficient to construct adversarial examples in the blackbox setting, due to the fact that the adversary has no access to the threshold θ used in the loss function f . To solve this problem, we present a novel algorithm for estimating θ. Estimating the threshold θ. To estimate the threshold, θ, in the black-box setting, the main technical challenge is that the estimated thresholdθ should be no less than the threshold θ in order to launch a successful attack, but should not exceed θ too much, otherwise, the attack cost might become too expensive. To solve this challenge, we propose a novel approach as shown in Algorithm 1. Given an OSI system with the scoring S and decision D modules, and an arbitrary voice x such that D(x) = reject, i.e., x is uttered by some source speaker, Algorithm 1 outputs an estimated thresholdθ.
In detail, Algorithm 1 first computes the maximal scoreθ = max i∈G [S(x)] i of the voice x by querying the system and then estimates the threshold by iteratively adding a search step ∆ onto the initial valueθ. Note that the initial valueθ must be less than the threshold θ, otherwise D(x) = reject. The search step ∆ we chose is |θ 10 |, as a tradeoff between the precision ofθ and efficiency of the algorithm. Indeed, the thresholdθ might not be precise enough if ∆ is too larger, whereas it might not be efficient if ∆ is too smaller.
Starting from the initial valueθ, Algorithm 1 iteratively repeats the following procedure. It first computes a loss function f obtained from the loss function f in Eq. (3) by replacing the threshold θ with the estimated thresholdθ and Algorithm 1 Threshold Estimation Algorithm Input: An arbitrary voice x such that D(x) = reject, the target OSI system with scoring S and decision D modules Output: Estimated thresholdθ 1:θ ← max i∈G [S(x)] i ; initial threshold 2: ∆ ← |θ 10 |; the search step 3:x ← x; 4: while True do 5:θ ←θ + ∆; 6:
while True do 7:
then computes a samplex according to the loss function f . (Note that to estimate the threshold θ, it suffices to use the loss function for untargeted attack.) If the system classifiers the samplex as one of the enrolled speakers, i.e., D(x) = reject, then the maximal score max i∈G [S(x)] i of the voicex must be no less than the actual unknown threshold θ. In this case, we return the estimated threshold,θ. Otherwise, if the maximal score max i∈G [S(x)] i is less than the current thresholdθ, we continue crafting samples using the loss function f and thresholdθ, intending to search a sample whose score is no less thanθ. If the maximal score max i∈G [S(x)] i becomes no less than the current thresholdθ, Algorithm 1 computes a new candidate thresholdθ by adding the search step ∆ ontoθ and repeats the above procedure. One may notice that Algorithm 1 will not terminate when D(x) is always equal to reject. In our experiments, this never happens (cf. Section V). Furthermore. it estimates a very close value of the actual threshold. Remark that the actual threshold θ, obtained from the open-source SRS, is used to evaluate the performance of Algorithm 1 only.
C. Attack on CSI Systems
A CSI system always classifier an input voice as one of the enrolled speakers. Therefore, we can adapt the attack on the OSI systems by ignoring the threshold θ. Specifically, the loss function for targeted attacking on CSI systems with the target speaker t ∈ G is defined as:
Intuitively, we want to find some small perturbation δ such that the score of the speaker t is the largest one among all the enrolled speakers, and, [S(x)] t is at least κ greater than the second-largest score.
Similarly, the loss function for untargeted attacking on CSI systems is defined as:
where m denotes the speaker of the original voice. Intuitively, we want to find some small perturbation δ such that the largest score of other enrolled speakers is at least κ greater than the score of the speaker m. 
D. Attack on SV Systems
An SV system has exactly one enrolled speaker and checks if an input voice is uttered by the enrolled speaker or not. Thus, we can adapt the attack on OSI systems by assuming the speaker group G is a singleton set. Specifically, the loss function for attacking SV systems is defined as:
Intuitively, we want to find a small perturbation δ such that the score of x being recognized as the enrolled speaker is at least κ greater than the threshold θ.
We remark that the threshold estimation algorithm for SV systems should be revised by replacing the loss function f at Line 7 in Algorithm 1 with the following function:
V. ATTACK EVALUATION
In this section, we first introduce the experiment design, and then evaluate FAKEBOB for its attacking capabilities using 13 representative attack scenarios (out of 40) based on the following five aspects: effectiveness/efficiency, transferability, practicability, imperceptibility, and robustness.
A. Dataset and Experiment Design
Dataset. As shown in Table I , we use voices from three widely used datasets (i.e., VoxCeleb1 [4] , VoxCeleb2 [62] , and LibriSpeech [63] ). To implement the state-of-the-art SRSs for demonstrating our attack, we choose the ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems provided in the popular open-source platform Kaldi. It obtains 7,631 stars and 3,418 forks on github [64] . We built UBM model using the Train-1 Set as the background voices. The OSI and CSI systems are enrolled using five speakers from the Test Speaker Set, forming a speaker group. The SV systems are also enrolled by five speakers from the Test Speaker Set, resulting in 5 ivector-PLDA systems and 5 GMM-UBM systems for the SV task. Table II shows the parameters used in our experiments. We conduct experiments on a server with Ubuntu 16.04 and Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697 v2 2.70GHz with 377G RAM (10 cores). Evaluation metrics. To evaluate the performance of our attack, we use the metrics shown in Table III . SNR is widely used to quantify the level of signal power to noise, so we use it here to measure the distortion of the adversarial sample over the original voice [9] . We use the equation, SNR(dB)= 10 log 10 (P x /P δ ), to obtain SNR, where P x is the signal power of the original voice x and P δ is the signal power of the perturbation δ. Larger SNR value indicates a smaller perturbation. To evaluate the efficiency of FAKEBOB, we use two traditional metrics: number of iterations and time.
(Note that the number of queries is the number of iterations multiplied by samples per draw in NES, i.e., 50 in this work.) Experiment design. To evaluate FAKEBOB, we design the following five experiments. (1) We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency on both open-source systems (i.e., ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems) and the commercial system Talentedsoft. We also evaluate FAKEBOB under intra-gender and inter-gender scenarios, as inter-gender attacks are usually more difficult. (2) We demonstrate the transferability by attacking the open-source systems with different architecture, training dataset, and parameters, as well as the commercial system Microsoft Azure. (3) We further demonstrate the practicability by playing the adversarial voices over the air in the physical world. To simulate an over-the-air attack, we play adversarial voices through a built-in loudspeaker of a laptop (Lenovo), record the air-transmitted voices by a built-in receiver of a mobile phone (OPPO) (the distance between them is 0.5 meter), and then feed the recorded voices to the target systems via exposed API. (4) For human-imperceptibility, we conduct a real human study through Amazon Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk) [26] , a crowdsourcing marketplace for human intelligence, using the adversarial voices crafted by FAKEBOB. (5) We finally evaluate whether potential defense methods (i.e., local smoothing, quantization and audio squeezing) proposed in the speech recognition domain can defend against FAKEBOB.
Since demonstrating all the 40 attack scenarios in our attack model (cf. Section II-B) requires huge engineering efforts, we design our experiments to cover 13 representative attack scenarios (cf. Appendix B). In particular, we only consider targeted attack that is much more powerful and challenging than untargeted attack [22] , [8] . Our experiments suffice to understand the other four parameters of the attack model, i.e., inter-gender vs. intra-gender, API vs. over-the-air, OSI vs. CSI vs. SV, decision and scores vs. decision-only.
The OSI task can be seen as a combination of the CSI and SV tasks (cf. Section II). Thus, we sometimes only report and analyze the results on the OSI task due to space limitation, which is much more challenging and representative than the other two. The missing results can be found in the appendix.
B. Effectiveness and Efficiency
Target model training. To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our attack, we train ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the OSI, CSI and SV tasks. As shown in Table IV , (1) the accuracy of ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the CSI task are 99.6% and 93.3%, respectively. (2) For the SV task, we adopt two commonly-used metrics: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) [17] . FAR is the proportion of voices that are uttered by imposters but accepted by the system, while FRR is the proportion of voices that are uttered by an enrolled speaker but rejected by the system. The threshold θ is usually chosen to satisfy FRR and/or FAR metrics. In this experiment, θ is 1.45 for GMM-UBM and 0.091 for ivector-PLDA so that the FAR is close to 10%. (3) For the OSI task, we consider an additional metric: Open-set Identification Error Rate (OSIER) [16] : the rate of voices that cannot be correctly classified. We use the same threshold θ as for the SV task, the OSIER, FAR and FRR values for the OSI task are shown in Table IV .
Black-box attack setting. The distance constraint is one of the most critical parameters of our attack. To fine-turn , we investigate ASR, efficiency, and distortion by varying from 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004, 0.003, 0.002, to 0.001, on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the CSI task. The visual distortions and tuning results are given in Appendix C and Appendix D, respectively. As a trade-off between ASR, efficiency, and distortion, we choose = 0.002 in the rest of the experiments unless explicitly stated.
The target speakers are the speakers from the Test Speaker Set (cf . Table I) , the source speakers are the speakers, from the Test Speaker Set for CSI, and from the Imposter Speaker Set (cf . Table I ) for SV and OSI. Ideally, we will craft 100 adversarial samples using FAKEBOB for each task, where 40 intra-gender and 60 inter-gender adversarial samples for CSI, and 50 intra-gender and 50 are inter-gender adversarial samples for SV and OSI. The summary is shown in Table V . Note that to diversify experiments, the source speakers of CSI and SV/OSI are designated to be different.
Black-box attack results. The results are shown in Table VII. Since the OSI task is more challenging and representative than the other two, we only analyze the results of the OSI task here. We can observe that FAKEBOB achieves 99.0% ASR for both ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM on the OSI task. In terms of SNR, the average SNR value is 31.5 (dB) for ivector-PLDA and 31.4 (dB) for GMM-UBM, indicating that the perturbation is less than 0.071% and 0.072%. Furthermore, the average numbers of iterations and execution time are 124 and 47.4 minutes on ivector-PLDA. The average numbers of iterations and execution time are 38 and 3.8 minutes on GMM-UBM, much smaller than that of ivector-PLDA. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of FAKEBOB.
To understand the attack difference between intra-gender and inter-gender, we take gender into account. The results are also shown in Table VII . We can observe that inter-gender attack is much more difficult (more iterations and execution time) than intra-gender attack due to the difference between sounds of male and female. Moreover, ASR of inter-gender attack is also lower than that of intra-gender attack. The result unveils that once the gender of the target speaker is known by attackers, it is much easier to launch an adversarial attack.
To evaluate our threshold estimation algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1), we report the estimated thresholdθ in Table VI by setting five different thresholds θ. The estimation error is less than 0.03 for ivector-PLDA and less than 0.003 for GMM- UBM. This shows that our algorithm is able to effectively estimate the threshold in less than 13.4 minutes. Note that our attack is black-box, and each threshold θ is accessed for evaluating our algorithm only.
Result of attacking the commercial system Talentedsoft. We also evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of FAKEBOB on the commercial system, Talentedsoft, developed by the constitutor of the voiceprint recognition industry standard of the Ministry of Public Security (China). We query this online platform via the HTTP post method (seen as the exposed API). Frequently querying via HTTP would cause too heavy traffic for the platform's server and may lead to DOS (Denial of Service). Therefore, we demonstrate our attack on its SV API and enroll one randomly chosen speaker from the Test Speaker Set (cf. Table I ). We attack the system using two randomly chosen source speakers from the Imposter Speaker Set and five randomly chosen voices per source speaker. Our attack successfully crafted 10 adversarial samples, achieving 100% ASR within 50 iterations (50×50=2,500 queries) on average. This demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of FAKEBOB on commercial systems that are completely blackbox. 
C. Transferability
Transferability [65] is the property that some adversarial samples produced to mislead a model (called source system) can mislead other models (called target system) even if their architectures, training dataset, or parameters differ.
Transferability attack setting. To evaluate the transferability of the adversarial voices crafted by FAKEBOB, we regard the GMM-UBM (system A) and ivector-PLDA (system B) systems as source systems, we build up to seven target systems differing in architecture, training dataset and key parameters as shown in Table VIII , yielding 16 distinct attacks (i to xvi) (cf. Table IX ). The distribution of the attacks is shown in Fig. 5 in terms of architecture, training dataset and key parameters. We can see that some attacks belong to multiple scenarios.
As aforementioned (cf. Section IV-B), we adjust the parameter κ to control the strength/confidence of adversarial samples. Hence, we vary the value of κ to understand the transferability. In addition, we set = 0.1 in this experiment as a tradeoff between the strength and imperceptibility of adversarial voices, because high-confidence adversarial voices usually require larger distortion which sacrifices the imperceptibility.
Transferability attack to open-source systems. As shown in Fig. 5 , attack ii (both cross-architecture and cross-dataset) is more challenging than attack x (cross-dataset), and attacks iii-viii (both cross-architecture and cross-parameter) are more challenging than attacks xi-xvi (cross-parameter). Thus, we only analyze the transferability results of eight attacks (i-viii) here due to the space limitation. The results and analysis of the other attacks (ix-xvi) are attached in Appendix E.
In general, the results show that the transferability rate increases along with the increase of κ. Specifically, (1) on the CSI task, as shown in Fig. 6 , when κ increases close to 0.35, all the attacks achieve more than 65% ASR, and achieve nearly 80% UTR (i.e., the target system misclassifies the adversarial samples). Even κ is less than 0.2, all the attacks are still able to achieve nearly 50% ASR. (2) On the SV task, less than 20% adversarial voices can be accepted by all the target systems when κ = 0. When κ increases close to 2.7, almost all the attacks are able to achieve nearly 60% ASR. (3) On the OSI task, when κ increases close to 2.6, ASR ranges from 50% (attack viii) to 95% (attack iii), and UTR ranges from 55% (attack viii) to 95% (attack iii).
We found that the target system of attack viii is system I. Compared with systems C-H, system I shares fewer parameters with the source system (i.e., feature extraction algorithm, dim of feature, frame length, etc. in Table VIII ). This reveals that the larger the difference between the source and target systems is, the more difficult the transferability attack is. This phenomenon also exists on the CSI and SV tasks. Due to the lack of space, results on the OSI and SV tasks are shown in Section E.
Transferability attack to the commercial system Microsoft Azure. Microsoft Azure is an intelligent cloud service platform with the second largest market share in the world. It supports both the SV and OSI tasks via HTTP REST API. Unlike Talentedsoft, Microsoft Azure's API only returns the decision (i.e., the predicted speaker) along with 3 confidence levels (i.e., low, normal and high) instead of scores, so we attack this platform via transferability. We enroll five speakers from the Test Speaker Set to build an OSI system on Microsoft Azure. We then test the baseline performance of this OSI system using the voices in the Imposter Speaker Set and the FAR is 0%. We attack Microsoft Azure using the adversarial samples crafted on the GMM-UBM system 1 , resulting in ASR=34% and UTR=57%.
Microsoft Azure also supports text-dependent SV task (10 fixed text), we create five enrollment voices via the Text-to-Speech engine [66] based on which the GMM-UBM and Microsoft Azure systems for the SV task are built. We then craft adversarial samples on the GMM-UBM system as the source system and conduct a transferability attack on Microsoft Azure as the target system. However, we found that Microsoft Azure just reported "error, too noisy" instead of "accept" or "reject", so the ASR is 0%. One possible reason is that Microsoft Azure for the SV task requires minimal SNR for input voice, which we thought is too strict to use in practice. Indeed, we played 50 normal voices via a built-in loudspeaker of a laptop (Lenovo), recorded them via a built-in receiver of a mobile phone (OPPO) with distances 0.5 meter (25 voices) and 1 meter (25 voices), and fed the recorded voices to Microsoft Azure via API. We surprisingly found that the system reported "error, too noisy" for 76% of the normal voices (56% for 0.5 meter and 96% for 1 meter).
D. Practicability for Over-the-Air Attack
When launching an over-the-air attack in the physical world, adversarial samples should be played through devices, transmitted in the air, and finally received by the receivers. Such an attack is more practical yet more challenging as the noise introduced from both air channel and electronic devices probably disrupts the perturbations of adversarial samples. Attack setting (over the air). We attack all tasks of ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems, while attack the OSI task of Microsoft Azure only, as its SV task is impractical for normal voices (cf. Section V-C). We set = 0.1, the same as in Section V-C, so that the perturbation is comparable or greater than the device noise, thus more robust against the noise.
To craft high-confidence adversarial samples, we set (1) 13.5 ≤ κ < 16 (ivector-PLDA) and 0.2 ≤ κ < 0.35 (GMM-UBM) for the CSI task, (2) 6.4 ≤ κ < 7 (ivector-PLDA) and 2.7 ≤ κ < 5 (GMM-UBM) for the SV task, and (3) 6.4 ≤ κ < 7 (ivector-PLDA) and 2.6 ≤ κ < 5 (GMM-UBM) for the OSI task.
The experiment is conducted in a relatively quiet room (12 meters long, 8 meters wide and 4 meters tall). We do not consider attacks under noisy environments because it is even difficult to correctly recognize normal voices. Results (over the air). The results of over-the-air attack are shown in Table X. (1) For the CSI task, FAKEBOB achieves 95% ASR (i.e., the target system classifies the adversarial voice as the target speaker) and 100% UTR (i.e., the target system does not classify the adversarial voice as the source speaker) on the GMM-UBM system, and achieves 40% ASR (80% UTR) on the ivector-PLDA system. (2) For the SV task, FAKEBOB achieves at least 70% ASR. (3) For the OSI task, FAKEBOB is able to achieve 90% ASR on the GMM-UBM system, which is slightly dropped to 65% on the ivector-PLDA system. (4) On the commercial system Microsoft Azure, 77% of adversarial samples are predicted as some enrolled speakers 2 , which is usually sufficient for launching an over-the-air attack. We can also observe only 9% of adversarial samples are predicted as the target speaker as this is the most challenging case (i.e., targeted, over-the-air and decision-only).
In terms of SNR, the average SNR is not less than 1.9 dB (except for the SV and OSI tasks of ivector-PLDA), and the average SNR reaches up to 3.6 dB on the GMM-UBM system for the CSI task, indicating that the power of the signal is 2.3 times greater than that of the noise. Thought the average SNR on the ivector-PLDA system for the SV and OSI tasks is less than 0 dB, but the maximal SNR is high, i.e., 6.7 dB and 5.5 dB, indicating that the power of the signal is 4.7 and 3.5 times greater than that of the noise. It is worth mentioning that our SNR is better than CommanderSong [9] in most cases. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our over-the-air attack.
E. Human-Imperceptibility via Human Study
To demonstrate the imperceptibility of adversarial samples, we conduct a human study on MTurk. The survey is approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of our institutes.
Setup of human study. We recruit participants from MTurk and ask them to choose one of the two tasks and finish the corresponding questionnaire. Note that we do not reveal the purpose of our study to the participants, and do not record any personal information. The two tasks are described as follows.
• Task 1: Clean or Noisy. This task asks participants to tell whether the playing voice is clean or noisy. Specifically, We randomly select 12 original voices and 15 adversarial voices crafted from other original voices, among which 12 adversarial voices are randomly selected from the voices which become non-adversarial (called ineffective) when playing over the air with = 0.002 and low confidence, and the other 3 are randomly selected from the voices which remain adversarial (called effective) when playing over the air with = 0.1 and high confidence. We ask users to choose whether a voice has any background noise (The three options are clean, noisy, and not sure). • Task 2: Identify the Speaker. This task asks participants to tell whether the voices in a pair are uttered by the same speaker. Specifically, we randomly select three speakers (two male and one female), and randomly choose one normal voice for each speaker (called reference voice). Then for each speaker, we randomly select 3 normal voices, 3 distinct adversarial voices that are crafted from other normal voices of the same speaker, and 3 normal voices from other speakers. In summary, we build 27 pairs of voices: 9 pairs are normal pairs (one reference voice and one normal voice from the same speaker), 9 pairs are other pairs (one reference voice and one normal voice from another speaker) and 9 pairs are adversarial pairs (one reference voice and one adversarial voice from the same speaker). Among 9 adversarial pairs, 6 pairs contain effective adversarial samples when playing over the air, and 3 pair do not. We ask the participants to tell whether the voices in each pair are uttered by the same speaker (The three options are same, different, and not sure). To ensure the quality of our questionnaire and validity of our results, we filter out the questionnaires that are randomly chosen by participants. In particular, we set three simple questions in each task. For task 1, we insert three silent voices as a concentration test. For task 2, we insert three pairs of voices, where each pair contains one male voice and one female voice as a concentration test. Only when all of them are correctly answered, we regard it as a valid questionnaire, otherwise, we exclude it.
Results of human study. We finally receive 108 valid questionnaires for task 1 and 161 valid questionnaires for task 2.
The results of the human study are shown in Fig. 7 .
For task 1, on average, 33.1% of adversarial voices are regarded as noisy by participants, only 22.4% higher than the baseline 10.7% of normal voices, indicating that adversarial voices crafted by FAKEBOB are not significantly noisier than normal voices. We further investigate the difference between the effective and ineffective adversarial voices when played over the air. For the ineffective ones, the proportion of voices being regarded as noisy drops to 20.2%, which is not statistically significantly different from the baseline 10.7%, indicating when listening to one voice alone (either original or adversarial), participants do not believe that adversarial voices are much noisy than original ones. For the effective ones, more than 12% of them are regarded as clean.
For task 2 which is more interesting, 86.5% of participants believe that voices in each other pair are uttered by different speakers, indicating the quality of collected questionnaires. For the adversarial pairs, 54.6% of participants believe that voices in each pair are uttered by the same speaker, very close to the baseline 53.7% of normal pairs, indicating that humans cannot differentiate the speakers of the normal and adversarial voices. For adversarial voices that become ineffective when played over the air, 64.9% of them are believed from the same speakers, much greater than the baseline 53.7%, thus more imperceptible. For the other adversarial voices, 33.9% is still believed from the same speaker, and 12.0% is not sure. The results unveil that the adversarial voice crafted by FAKEBOB can make systems misbehave (i.e., making a decision that the adversarial voice is uttered by the target speaker), while for ordinary users, it sounds like the source speaker' voice. Hence, our attack is very surreptitious.
F. Robustness of FAKEBOB against Defense Methods
To our knowledge, there are no domain-specific defense solutions against adversarial attacks on SRSs. Hence, we implement and test three defense methods: local smoothing, quantization, and audio squeezing from the speech recognition domain, as discussed in Section III-B. For ease of illustration, we only report the defense results on the GMM-UBM system for the OSI task. We use the FRR metric to evaluate the impact of defense method on normal voices, and the UTR metric to evaluate defense effectiveness against adversarial voices.
Local smoothing: It mitigates adversarial attacks by applying the mean, median or gaussian filter to the waveform of a voice. Based on the results in [27] , we use the median filter. A median filter with kernel size k (must be odd) replaces each audio element x k by the median of k values [
]. We vary the kernel size k from 3 to 19 with step 2. The results are shown in Fig. 8a . Though, the UTR of low-confidence adversarial voices drops from 99% to nearly 0%, the minimal FRR of normal voices increases to 35%, significantly larger than the baseline 4.17%. Furthermore, the median filter is not effective against high-confidence adversarial voices. These results indicate that the median filter fails to defend against FAKEBOB.
Quantization: It rounds the amplitude of each sample point of a voice to the nearest integer multiple of factor q to mitigate the perturbation. We vary q from 128, 256, 512 to 1024 as [27] did. However, the system did not output any result on both adversarial and normal voices. An in-depth analysis of the system reveals that all the frames of adversarial and normal voices are regarded as unvoiced frame by the Voice Activity Detection (VAD) [67] component. This demonstrates that quantization is not suitable for defending against FAKEBOB.
Audio squeezing: It down-samples voices and applies signal recovery to disrupt the perturbation of adversarial voices. We vary τ (the ratio between new and original sampling frequency) from 0.1 to 0.9, the same as [9] . (Note that the FRR and UTR for τ = 1 are the same as the baseline.) The results are shown in Fig. 8b . We can observe that when τ = 0.9, the FRR 6% of normal voices is close to the baseline 4.17%, and the UTR of the low-confidence adversarial voices is 17% which is much smaller than the baseline 99%. However, the UTR of the high-confidence adversarial voices is the same as the baseline (i.e., 99%) when τ = 0.9. These results indicate that audio squeezing fails to defend against FAKEBOB.
VI. DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE ARM RACE
This section discusses the potential mitigation of our attacks and possible advanced attacks.
Mitigation of FAKEBOB.
We have demonstrated that three defense methods are ineffective against FAKEBOB although they are reported promising in the speech recognition domain. This reveals that more effective defense methods are needed to mitigate FAKEBOB. We discuss several possible defense methods as follows. Fig. 8 : Results of the defense methods: median filter and audio squeezing where UTR-lc denotes UTR of low-confidence adversarial voices (κ=0), and UTR-hc denotes UTR of highconfidence adversarial voices (0 < κ < 5). Note that FRR=4.17% and UTR=99% without defense.
Various liveness detection methods have been proposed to detect spoofing attacks on SRSs. Such methods detect attacks by exploiting the different physical characteristics of the voices generated by the human speech production system (i.e., lungs, vocal cords, and vocal tract) and electronic loudspeaker. For instance, Shiota et al. [68] use pop noise caused by human breath, VoiceLive [69] leverages time-difference-of-arrival of voices to the receiver, and VoiceGesture [70] leverages the unique articulatory gesture of the user. Adversarial voices also need to be played via loundspeakers, hence liveness detection could be used to detect them.
An alternative detection method is to train a detector using adversarial voices and normal voices. Though promising in image recognition domain [71] , it has a very high false-positive rate and does not improve the robustness when the adversary is aware of this defense [72] .
Another scheme to mitigate adversarial images is input transformation such as image bit-depth reduction and JPEG compression [73] . We could mitigate adversarial voices by leveraging input transformations such as bit-depth reduction and MP3 compression. However, Athalye et al. [74] have demonstrated that input transformation on images can be easily circumvented by strong attacks such as Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation. We conjecture that bit-depth reduction and MP3 compression may become ineffective for high-confidence adversarial voices.
Finally, one could also improve the security of SRSs by using a text-dependent system and requiring users to read dynamically and randomly generated sentences. By doing so, the adversary has to attack both the speaker recognition and the speech recognition, hence incurring attack costs.
In our future work, we will study the above methods for adversarial attacks. In the rest of this section, we discuss possible methods on improving adversarial attacks. Possible advanced attacks. For a system that outputs the decision result and scores, FAKEBOB can directly craft adversarial voices via interacting with it. However, for a system that only outputs the decision result, we have to attack it by leveraging transferability. When the gap between source and target systems is larger, the transferability rate is limited.
One possible solution to improve FAKEBOB is to leverage the boundary attack, which is proposed to attack decision-only image recognition systems by Brendel et al. [75] .
Our human study demonstrates that adversarial voices generated by FAKEBOB is imperceptible (i.e., users cannot differentiate the speakers of the original and adversarial voices), indicating that restricting the maximal value of L ∞ is feasible and usually sufficient to craft imperceptible adversarial voices. However, some of the adversarial voices are still noisier than original voices (human study task 1). One possible solution to improve imperceptibility is to build a psychoacoustic model and limit the maximal difference between the spectrum of the original and adversarial voices to the masking threshold (hearing threshold) of human perception [76] , [77] .
VII. RELATED WORK
The security issues of intelligent voice systems have been studied in the literature. In this section, we discuss the most related work on attacks over the intelligent voice systems, and compare them with FAKEBOB. Adversarial voice attacks. Gong et al. [12] and Kreuk et al. [13] respectively proposed adversarial voice attacks on SRSs in the white-box setting, by leveraging the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [21] . The attack in [12] addresses DNNbased gender recognition, emotion recognition and close-set identification systems, while the attack in [13] addresses a DNN-based speaker verification system. Compared to these attacks: (1) Our black-box attack FAKEBOB is more practical, which only has access to the input and output of the target system. (2) FAKEBOB not only addresses the speaker verification and close-set identification but also the more general task, open-set identification. (3) Instead of attacking DNNbased systems, we demonstrate our attack on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems in the popular open-source platform Kaldi. Theoretically, our attack is generic and can be used to attack DNN-based systems. However, their attacks did not consider the score threshold, hence would be ineffective on ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems. (4) Furthermore, FAKEBOB is effective on the commercial systems, even when playing over the air, which was not considered in [12] , [13] .
In a concurrent work, Abdullah et al. [78] proposed a poisoning attack on speaker and speech recognition systems, that is demonstrated on the open-set identification in Microsoft Azure. There are four key differences: (1) Their goal is to craft an adversarial voice from a voice uttered by an enrolled speaker such that it is misclassified as another enrolled speaker, which is a restricted untargeted attack. Our goal is to craft an adversarial voice from a voice uttered by an arbitrary speaker such that it is misclassified as a target speaker (targeted attack) or another enrolled speaker (untargeted attack). Thus, our attack is more practical and powerful. (2) Their attack is ineffective on speaker verification or in a more practical setting where the adversary wants to bypass a biometric authentication instead of hiding the identity. (3) They craft adversarial voice by decomposing and reconstructing an input voice, hence, achieved a limited untargeted success rate and cannot be adapted to launch more interesting and powerful targeted attacks. (4) We evaluate overthe-air attacks in the physical world, but they did not.
We cannot compare the performance (i.e., effectiveness and efficiency) of our attack with the three related works above [12] [13] [78] because all of them are not available.
Adversarial attacks on speech recognition systems also have been studied [10] , [8] , [79] . Nicholas et al. [8] attacked DeepSpeech [80] by crafting adversarial voices in the whitebox setting, but failed to attack when playing over the air. In the black-box setting, Rohan et al. [10] combined a genetic algorithm with finite difference gradient estimation to craft adversarial voices for DeepSpeech, but achieved a limited success rate with strict length restriction over the voices. Alzantot et al. [79] presented the first black-box adversarial attack on a CNN-based speech command classification model by exploiting a genetic algorithm. However, due to the difference between speaker recognition and speech recognition, these works are orthogonal to our work and cannot be applied to ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM based SRSs. Other types of voice attacks. Other types of voice attacks include hidden voice attack (both against speech and speaker recognition) and spoofing attack (against speaker recognition).
Hidden voice attack aims to embed some information (e.g., command) into an audio carrier (e.g., music) such that the desired information is recognized by the target system without catching victims' attention.
Abdullah et al. [81] proposed such an attack on speaker and speech recognition systems. There are two key differences: (1) Based on characteristics of signal processing and psychoacoustics, their attack perturbed a sample uttered by an enrolled speaker such that it is still correctly classified as the enrolled speaker by the target system but becomes incomprehensible to human listening. While our attack perturbed a sample uttered by an arbitrary speaker such that it is misclassified as a target speaker (targeted attack) or another enrolled speaker (untargeted attack) but the perturbation is imperceptible to human listening. This means that their attack addresses a different attack scenario than ours. (2) They did not demonstrate overthe-air attack on SRSs and their tool is not available, hence it is unclear how effective it is on SRSs.
DolphinAttack [82] , CommanderSong [9] and the work done by Nicholas et al. [28] proposed hidden voice attacks on speech recognition systems. Nicholas et al. launched both black-box (i.e., inverse MFCC) and white-box (i.e., gradient decent) attacks on GMM-HMM based speech recognition systems. DolphinAttack exploited vulnerabilities of microphones and employed the ultrasound as the carrier of commands to craft inaudible voices. However, it can be easily defended by filtering out the ultrasound from voices. CommanderSong launched white-box attacks by exploiting a gradient descent method to embed commands into music songs.
Another attack type on SRSs is spoofing attack [83] such as mimic [84] , replay [85] , voice synthesis [86] , and voice conversion [87] attacks. Spoofing attack aims at obtaining a voice (e.g., record-and-replay) such that it is correctly classified as the target speaker by the system, and also sound like the target speaker listened by ordinary users. The victim will hear her/his own voice in spoofing attack, but hear the source speaker's voice in our attack. When the victim can hear the voice used for attack, our attack is less likely to catch the victim's attention, thus more practical and surreptitious.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of adversarial attack on SRSs in a practical black-box setting, by proposing a novel practical adversarial attack FAKEBOB. FAKEBOB was evaluated on all the three recognition tasks in 13 attack scenarios. FAKEBOB achieved close to 100% targeted attack success rate on both open-source and commercial systems (e.g., Talentedsoft). We also demonstrated the transferability of FAKEBOB on Microsoft Azure. When played over the air in the physical world, FAKEBOB achieved at least 65% untargeted success rate. Our findings reveal the security implications of FAKEBOB for SRSs, calling for more robust defense methods to better secure SRSs against such practical adversarial attacks.
APPENDIX

A. Comparison of our FAKEBOB and PSO-based Method
In this section, we compare our attack FAKEBOB over a PSO-based method. We reduce the finding of an adversarial sample as an optimization problem (cf. Section IV-A), then solve the optimization problem via the PSO algorithm.
PSO solves the optimization problem by imitating the behaviour of a swarm of birds [88] . Each particle is a candidate solution, and in each iteration, the particle updates itself by the weighted linear combination of three parts, i.e., inertia, local best solution and global best solution. The related weights are initial inertia factor w init , final inertia factor w end , acceleration constant c 1 and c 2 .
We implement a PSO-based attack following the algorithm of Sharif et al. [57] which is used to fool face recognition systems. After fine-tuning the above hyper-parameters, we conduct the experiment using the PSO-based method with 50 particles for a maximum of 35 epochs, and we set the iteration limitation of each epoch to 30, w init to 0.9, w end to 0.1, c 1 to 1.4961 and c 2 to 1.4961. The experiment is conducted on the ivector-PLDA system for the OSI task.
The results are shown in Table XI . For comparison purposes, we also report the results of our attack FAKEBOB in Table XI . Overall, the PSO-based method achieves 33% targeted attack success rate (ASR), only one-third of FAKEBOB, indicating that FAKEBOB is much more effective than the PSO-based method. Specifically, the PSO-based method is less effective for input voices whose initial scores are low. Whereas our attack FAKEBOB is more effective no matter the initial scores of input voices. In terms of efficiency, FAKEBOB takes less number of iterations and execution time than the PSO-based method, except for the case −0.5 < [S(x 0 )] t ≤ 0 on which the PSO-based method is only able to launch a successful attack for one voice. Specifically, the higher the initial score of the input voice is, the more efficient of our attack FAKEBOB is compared to the PSO-based method. For instance, when 0.5 < [S(x 0 )] t ≤ 1, the number of iterations (resp. execution time) of the PSO-based method is 17 times (resp. 15 times) larger than the one of FAKEBOB.
In summary, the experimental results demonstrate that our attack FAKEBOB is much more effective and efficient than the PSO-based method.
B. 13 Attack Scenarios
All of following combinations are evaluated under targeted attack. XI: Comparison of attack effectiveness and efficiency between our attack FAKEBOB and the PSO-based method, where [S(x 0 )] t denotes the initial score of the speaker t for the input voice x 0 , and * denotes that only one adversarial attack succeeds. Fig. 10 : Transferability results of attacks (i-viii) on the OSI task, where r1 denotes κ = 0, r2 denotes 0 < κ < 0.9, r3 denotes 0.9 ≤ κ < 1.4, r4 denotes 1.4 ≤ κ < 2, r5 denotes 2 ≤ κ < 2.6, r6 denotes 2.6 ≤ κ < 5. Fig. 11 : Transferability result for attacks (i-viii) on the SV task, where r1 denotes κ = 0, r2 denotes 0 < κ < 0.9, r3 denotes 0.9 ≤ κ < 1.4, r4 denotes 1.4 ≤ κ < 2, r5 denotes 2 ≤ κ < 2.7, r6 denotes 2.7 ≤ κ < 5. 
C. Visual Distortions for Different Values of the Parameter
In Fig. 9 , we present the intuitive illustration of distortions under different distance constraint from 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004, 0.003, 0.002, to 0.001, where the blue lines represent the distortion. It is obvious that the smaller the value of is, the less noticeable the perturbation is. Though there may be a gap between vision and listening of human, it is reasonable to believe that smaller makes the adversarial voice more imperceptible to human listening. Table XII shows the results of tuning the parameter on both ivector-PLDA and GMM-UBM systems for the CSI task. To choose a suitable , we need to trade off the imperceptibility and the attack cost. Smaller contributes to less perturbation (i.e, higher SNR), but also give rise to the attack cost (i.e, more number of iterations and execution time and lower success rate). We found that 0.002 is a more suitable value for for two reasons: (1) compared with 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004, 0.003, the average SNR of adversarial voices when = 0.002 is higher, indicating that = 0.002 introduces less perturbation, while the success rate of 0.002 is merely 1% lower than that of 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.004 and 0.003. (2) = 0.001 introduce less perturbation than = 0.002, but the success rate of = 0.001 drops to 41% for ivector-PLDA and 87% for GMM-UBM, 58% and 12% lower than that of = 0.002. Moreover, the attack cost increases more sharply when decreasing from 0.002 to 0.001 compared with decreasing from 0.003 to 0.002. That is, the number of iterations and execution time of = 0.002 are 1.6 times and 1.4 times of that of = 0.003, while the number of iterations and execution time of = 0.001 are 2.2 times and 2.4 times of that of = 0.002. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the transferability results of attacks (i-viii) on the OSI and SV tasks, respectively. The adversarial voices are crafted on the GMM-UBM source system (i.e., system A in Table VIII ) and transferred to the other eight systems (i.e., systems B-I in Table VIII ). Table XIV, Table XV and Table XVI show the transferability results of attacks (ixxvi) on the CSI, SV and OSI tasks, respectively.
D. Results of Tuning the Parameter
E. Transferability Attack Result of Attack i-Attack xvi
For the CSI and OSI tasks, both ASR and UTR of κ > 0 are greater than that of κ = 0, indicating that increasing the adversarial strength makes adversarial voices more transferable. For the SV task, compared to when κ = 0, more adversarial voices generated on the source system remain adversarial (i.e., being accepted) on target systems when κ > 0. For the CSI task, when 0 < κ < 16, more than 84% of the adversarial voices generated on the source system are misclassified by all the eight target systems. For the SV task, when κ = 0, the maximal ASR is 16.0% (attack xiv), while when 0 < κ < 7, the maximal ASR increases to 100% (attack xiv and xv). For the OSI task, considering attacks (x-xvi) whose corresponding systems (i.e., system C-I) has the same architecture (i.e., ivector-PLDA) with the source system (system B), when 0 < κ < 7, attack x holds the lowest UTR and ASR, and attack xvi holds the 2nd lowest UTR and ASR among the eights attacks. Notice that the target systems of attack x and attack xvi are system C and system I, respectively. System C is trained on a disjoint dataset from the source system, and compared with systems (D-H), system I shares the least parameters in common with the source system. This reveals that the larger the difference between the source and target systems is, the more difficult the transferability attack is.
